




he Tax Reform Act of 1986 made sweeping changes to the U.S. tax
code. It lowered statutory tax rates on both corporate and personal in-
come while eliminating the investment tax credit and a host of other
specialized tax deductions in an effort to ensure that all ﬁrms paid similar tax
rates. The act devoted special attention to commercial banks. Studies com-
missioned by Congress had found that the commercial banking industry paid
much lower average tax rates than most other ﬁrms, reinforcing a perception
that banks enjoyed many unfair tax advantages. With passage of the Tax Re-
form Act, the industry lost many tax preferences it had previously enjoyed.
Available evidence suggests that tax reform achieved its goal, at least insofar
as the commercial banking industry is concerned: average tax rates paid by the
U.S. banking industry rose from 24 percent in 1986 to 41 percent in 1995.
Some of the tax preferences banks lost under tax reform originally had been
intended to offset the costs of implicit taxes such as the non-interest-bearing
reserve requirements banks are obligated to hold with the Federal Reserve (the
Fed) as well as the cost of other regulations (Neubig 1984). Under the current
tax code, banks face the same treatment as all other ﬁnancial intermediaries
but are still subject to the aforementioned costs. Moreover, Henderson (1987)
found that the cost of reserve requirements had not been offset by implicit
subsidies associated with the banking charter, such as access to the discount
window.
Banks have long argued that the costs of reserve requirements and other
burdensome regulations put them at a competitive disadvantage relative to other
ﬁnancial intermediaries. This assertion has received some support from Mc-
Cauley and Seth (1992), who found that foreign banks had gained a 45 percent
share of the U.S. commercial and industrial loan market by 1991 and attributed
this trend to the burden of reserve requirements imposed on U.S. banks.
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Deposit insurance premiums levied on U.S. banks also may be viewed as
an implicit tax in certain circumstances. Congress recently enacted legislation
requiring commercial banks to help pay for the recapitalization of the thrift in-
dustry’s deposit insurance fund through a special deposit insurance surcharge.
If they are fairly priced, deposit insurance premiums represent a cost of doing
business and not a tax. But when a surcharge is imposed to fund other purposes,
deposit insurance premiums may constitute a tax on banks. One interesting
question, then, is how signiﬁcant this tax is in relation to the overall effective
tax rate on banks.
These observations raise fundamental issues about the effects of explicit
and implicit taxes on the ﬁnancial system. According to the U.S. Flow of Funds
Accounts, the commercial banking industry’s share of total credit extended in
the United States has fallen steadily in recent years, from almost 45 percent of
all credit market assets in 1952 to 22 percent in 1995. While ﬁnancial inno-
vation is most often blamed for this process of disintermediation, it is worth
examining whether the tax and regulatory policies may have contributed to this
trend.
This study takes a ﬁrst step toward analyzing the burden of U.S. bank tax
and regulatory policies by developing a comprehensive measure of the overall
marginal effective tax rate on commercial bank intermediation. Economists
have long recognized that average tax rates do not provide a good measure of
the tax disincentives to investment. Most contemporary studies focus instead on
the marginal effective tax rate, which measures the marginal tax on investment
returns. Studies of bank taxation have been a notable exception to this rule—
existing studies have sought to measure the impact of tax reform by estimating
average effective tax rates. None of these studies has examined the marginal
tax rate on bank lending. Such an exercise turns out to be worthwhile, as it
produces some surprising results. In particular, it ﬁnds that the behavior of the
average effective tax rate has not been a good indicator of the tax disincentives
to commercial bank lending.
The discussion that follows begins in Section 1 with an examination of
the conceptual issues associated with measuring effective tax rates. Section 2
develops a ﬁnancial model of banks that can be used to estimate an effective
tax rate on commercial bank intermediation. Empirical results are presented in
Section 3. The ﬁnal section reviews the conclusions of the analysis.
1. MEASURING EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON
CAPITAL INCOME
An effective tax rate is a summary statistic that measures the tax burden associ-
ated with an activity. Tax codes stipulate not only a statutory tax rate, but also
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measure of true economic income, however. For this reason, the effective tax
rate on investment can differ substantially from the statutory tax rate.
Effective tax rates are sometimes used to measure the impact of taxes on
incentives. Many studies compute an average effective tax rate, deﬁned as actual
taxes paid divided by capital income, to provide a summary statistic of the tax
burden on a particular ﬁrm or industry.1 Fullerton (1984) gives several reasons
why average effective tax rates may not accurately measure the disincentives to
investment created by the tax code, however. First, relying solely on U.S. taxes
paid by a corporation ignores foreign taxes paid by the ﬁrm. Second, proﬁts
measured for tax purposes differ from proﬁts measured for ﬁnancial reporting.
Third, taxes paid in a given year might not be related to actual proﬁts earned
that year due to carryforwards of previous losses and tax credits. Finally, proﬁt
measures typically used for calculating average effective tax rates are broken
down by ﬁrm or by industry rather than by asset class. Thus, while average
effective tax rates may be appropriate for measuring cash ﬂows and distribu-
tional burden, they do not necessarily measure the disincentives to investment
inherent in the tax code.
More recent research on the incentive effects of taxation has focused on
the “marginal effective tax rate,” which measures the extra tax resulting from
a hypothetical marginal investment by a ﬁrm in a given industry. A marginal
effective tax rate measures the wedge between the marginal social return to
a capital asset and the rate of return earned by the investors who ﬁnance its
purchase. This wedge can be viewed as a measure of the disincentives to
investment created by the tax code.
Thus, marginal effective tax rates are better suited to capture disincentives
to investment. Moreover, average tax rates do not reﬂect the burden of implicit
taxes such as reserve requirements or deposit insurance surcharges.2 When
Fullerton and Henderson (1985) compare average and marginal effective tax
rates for 18 industries, they ﬁnd almost no correspondence between the two
measures.
The effective tax rate methodology can be extended to include personal
taxes paid on dividends and interest as well as corporate taxes. Measures of
the effective tax rate that include personal income taxes can be used to ana-
lyze the effect of taxation on the intertemporal allocation of resources. If one
is interested in the allocation of capital among competing uses, however, or
among competing ﬁrms engaged in similar activities but subject to different
tax treatment—such as comparison of the tax disincentives to lending between
1 Harberger’s (1966) classic article on the efﬁciency effects of capital income taxes uses this
approach.
2 A notable exception here is Henderson (1987), who incorporates the cost of various implicit
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commercial banks and other ﬁnancial intermediaries—then consideration of
personal taxes is unnecessary.3
As noted in the introduction, previous studies on the taxation of commercial
banking have focused on the impact of changes in tax laws on total taxes paid
by commercial banks.4 While such studies can be useful in evaluating the tax
burden borne by the industry, the foregoing discussion suggests that they may
not be useful in measuring the disincentives to traditional forms of bank credit
intermediation created by corporate taxes and reserve requirements. This study
differs from other studies on the taxation of commercial banking in that it
estimates the marginal effective tax rate on commercial bank intermediation.
Using this model, one can also estimate the disincentives to commercial bank
intermediation inherent in regulations such as reserve requirements or deposit
insurance surcharges. Since the analysis focuses only on the distributional im-
pact of explicit and implicit taxes, it ignores personal taxes paid by households.
Measurements of marginal effective tax rates are typically derived using the
“user cost of capital” methodology developed by Hall and Jorgenson (1967).
Hall and Jorgenson’s measure of user cost reﬂects not only the ﬁnancial cost
of capital—that is, the cost of ﬁnancing an investment—but also the cost of
depreciation expenses and income taxes. The user cost is sometimes called an
implicit rental rate because it reﬂects the rental cost the owner of a capital asset
would have to charge to cover the costs of ﬁnancing the purchase of the asset
along with the cost of depreciation and income taxes. In a perfectly competitive
market, this user cost would exactly equal the rental rate on capital—hence the
term implicit rental rate. Once the user cost of capital is derived, the marginal
effective tax rate can be calculated from the difference between the before-tax
return on investment and the after-tax rate of return earned by the investors
who ﬁnanced the investment.5 The following section reviews this methodology
in more detail.
2. TAXES, RESERVE REQUIREMENTS, AND
THE COST OF CAPITAL
Based on the foregoing discussion, the measurement of effective tax rates re-
quires a precise measure of how explicit and implicit taxes affect the user cost
3 If capital markets are efﬁcient, the opportunity cost of funding will not depend on which
agent in the economy buys the bonds or equity issued by the ﬁrms. In this case, the cost of capital
to ﬁrms does not depend on the distribution of personal tax rates. See Fullerton (1984) for a more
comprehensive discussion.
4 See, for example, Henderson (1987), O’Brien and Gelfand (1987a, b), and Neubig and
Sullivan (1987). The latter three studies estimate the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on
after-tax bank proﬁts.
5 See Bradford and Fullerton (1981) for a detailed discussion of the conceptual issues in-
volved in measuring marginal effective tax rates.A. Kuprianov: Tax Disincentives to Commercial Bank Lending 71
of capital. Understanding the impact of taxes on the cost of capital requires an
understanding of the basic theory of capital budgeting. Accordingly, the analysis
that follows ﬁrst reviews capital budgeting theory and then applies the capital
budgeting model to commercial banks. This model is used to derive an expres-
sion for the cost of capital that incorporates the effects of reserve requirements
as well as deposit insurance premiums and corporate income taxes.
Review of the Basic Capital Budgeting Model
To begin, consider the simple case of a ﬁrm that ﬁnances a capital investment k
by issuing interest-bearing debt, D, and equity, S. Capital invested by the ﬁrm
earns a constant and known rate of return of ψ per period, so gross revenues
accruing to a capital stock k are ψ k. Assume capital depreciates at a constant
geometric rate δ. Then, the ﬁrm can only maintain its capital stock at a constant
level k by investing an additional δk units of capital in each period. By doing
so, the ﬁrm maintains a constant net cash ﬂow of
X = (ψ − δ)k (1)
in perpetuity.
The value of the ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂows is determined by the cost of cap-
ital, which, in turn, is determined by the rate of return demanded by investors
in capital markets. For simplicity, assume the ﬁrm’s debt takes the form of a
bond issued in perpetuity that pays a ﬁxed coupon R in each period. Let ρ1
denote the interest rate demanded by bondholders. Then, the value of the ﬁrm’s






Now suppose that all returns net of investment and interest expense are
paid to shareholders as dividends, denoted E. Then
X = R + E. (3)
Since both X and R are constant over time, so is E.
Let ρ2 denote the rate of return demanded by shareholders. Then, the value
of the ﬁrm’s equity shares will be determined by the present value of all future
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The value of all outstanding claims against the ﬁrm is just
V = D + S
= R/ρ1 + E/ρ2 (5)
= ρ−1(R + E),
where
ρ = λ1ρ1 + λ2ρ2, and
λ1 = D/V (6)
λ2 = S/V.
The variable ρ represents the ﬁnancial cost of capital. It is the rate of return the
ﬁrm must earn on its investment to be able to pay the rates of return demanded
by its bondholders and shareholders.6
Substituting from (1) and (3) into (5) yields an expression for the value of
the ﬁrm in terms of its capital stock, k, and the other variables of the model:
V = ρ−1(ψ − δ)k. (7)
Assuming that capital markets are perfectly competitive, the equilibrium present
value of cash ﬂows from the investment will just equal the purchase price of
the capital acquired by the ﬁrm. In equilibrium, then,
V = k. (8)
From equation (7), this requirement translates into the condition
ψ = ρ + δ. (9)
Equation (9) simply shows that in equilibrium the marginal rate of return on
investment, ψ , will equal the sum of the ﬁnancial cost of capital, ρ, which
represents the rate of return required by investors, and the marginal cost of
depreciation, δ. The term of the right-hand side of equation (9) is the user cost,
or implicit rental rate on capital. Note that the stationary nature of this model
environment ensures that λ1 and λ2 are both constant over time with
D = λ1k, and
S = λ2k. (10)
6 In a more rigorously articulated model, ρ1 and ρ2 would differ because of varying degrees
of risk associated with each type of asset. For purposes of this analysis, however, I adopt the
approach common in most intermediate ﬁnance textbooks and simply assume that rates of return
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This last result, while not important to the foregoing analysis, will be useful
later on.
As an aside, the well-known Modigliani-Miller Theorem states that the
ﬁnancial cost of capital, ρ, is independent of the ﬁrm’s capital structure when
capital markets are perfect—that is, when capital markets are perfectly compet-
itive, transactions costs are negligible, and investors have as much information
about the ﬁrm’s investment opportunities as its managers. Under these assump-
tions, a ﬁrm’s investment decisions are unaffected by the mix of debt and
equity it issues. This result no longer holds when corporate income taxes are
introduced into the model, however.
Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital
The U.S. tax code deﬁnes taxable income as operating revenues less interest,
allowable depreciation, and other operating expenses. Since this analysis fo-
cuses on the effective tax rate on capital, it will abstract from any expenses not
directly affecting the cost of capital or the treatment of capital-related expenses
such as depreciation allowances. As before, let ψ k denote gross revenues and
assume that the ﬁrm maintains a constant, ﬁxed capital stock. Let Z denote the
nominal depreciation allowance permitted under the tax code. Then, taxable
proﬁts can be expressed as
π = ψ k − R − Z, (11)
where R denotes nominal interest payments.
Let θ denote the corporate income tax rate. Then, net after-tax cash ﬂow
can be calculated by subtracting corporate income taxes from net pre-tax cash
ﬂow, as deﬁned in equation (1):
Xa = (ψ − δ)k − θπ. (12)
Combining (11) and (12) yields
Xa = (1 − θ)ψ k + θR − δk + Z. (13)
Examine the term on the right-hand side of (13). Because interest expense
affects taxable income, the variable R now appears in the expression for net
cash ﬂow. As a result, the ﬁrm’s capital structure will now inﬂuence its cost of
capital, and therefore its investment decisions. To see how, consider the rela-
tionship between interest expense and the ﬁrm’s capital stock. From equation
(2), R = ρ1D. Together with equation (10), this implies
R = λ1ρ1k. (14)
Now consider the tax deduction for depreciation. The taxable depreciation
allowance will not necessarily equal true economic depreciation. In fact, the
two will differ in most cases. The taxable depreciation allowance depends on74 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
the rules for computing the depreciable lifetime of assets and the time path of
the capital stock. For purposes of the present analysis, assume that Z can be
factored as
Z = ζk, (15)
where ζ is some constant. As will be seen later on, all depreciation allowances
examined in this study can be factored into such a form.
Substituting (14) and (15) into (13) yields an expression for after-tax cash
ﬂows as a function of the steady-state capital stock, k, and the other underlying
variables of the model:
Xa = [(1 − θ)ψ + θλ1ρ1 − (δ − θζ)]k. (16)
The after-tax value of the investment, Va, is just the present value of its after-
tax net cash ﬂow discounted using the after-tax cost of capital:
Va = ρ−1Xa. (17)
In equilibrium, the present value of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows will equal the cost of
the initial capital stock purchased by the ﬁrm. Thus,
Va = k.
This last relation implies









is the pre-tax ﬁnancial cost of capital. The pre-tax cost of capital differs from
the after-tax cost of capital, ρ, in that the after-tax return to equity, ρ2, is divided
by (1 − θ) in (19). The best way to understand this result is to note that the
presence of a corporate income tax requires the ﬁrm to earn a pre-tax rate of
return on equity of ρ2/(1 − θ) so it can pay out an after-tax rate of ρ2 to its
shareholders.
Now examine the second term on the right-hand side of (18). This term
reﬂects the cost of depreciation, net of any taxable depreciation expenses. To







The cost of depreciation in the presence of corporate income taxes is the true de-
preciation rate plus the cost of the tax distortion stemming from any differences
between the true economic depreciation rate and the depreciation allowance
permitted for tax purposes. In the special case where the taxable depreciation
allowance exactly equals true economic depreciation (that is, when ζ = δ), theA. Kuprianov: Tax Disincentives to Commercial Bank Lending 75
right-hand side term in (20) reduces to the true economic cost of depreciation,
δ. But when ζ < δ, the effective cost of depreciation under taxation is greater
than it would be otherwise. In this case, the second term on the right-hand
side of (20) shows how much the capital investment must earn at the margin
to pay the added tax caused by the distortion in the tax code. Conversely, an
excessively liberal depreciation allowance would effectively reduce the cost of
depreciation.
Taken together, the sum appearing on the right-hand side of (18) reﬂects
the ﬁrm’s pre-tax user cost of capital. It shows how much the ﬁrm’s capital
investment must earn at the margin so as to pay investors in bond and equity
markets the returns they expect after corporate income taxes and depreciation.
The User Cost of Capital for Commercial Bank Lending
Commercial banks are generally subject to the same tax rules as all other U.S.
companies. Thus, the foregoing model of investment and capital budgeting can
be applied to bank lending if the variables are interpreted differently. Instead
of representing physical capital, let the variable k represent the dollar value
of a portfolio of loans. Then, the marginal return on investment, ψ , can be
viewed as the commercial loan rate. Under this interpretation, ψ k denotes gross
revenues from lending.
While bank loans do not depreciate the way physical capital does, banks do
incur loan losses. Loan losses affect earnings in much the same way deprecia-
tion affects the productivity of physical capital in the model presented above:
when a borrower defaults on a loan, the lender no longer receives income from
that loan. Accordingly, let the variable δ now represent the fraction of a bank’s
loan portfolio that must be written off in each period. As before, assume δ
is constant over time. Under this interpretation the variable Z can be viewed
as the maximum loan loss provision permitted by the tax code. As with other
types of depreciation allowances, the loan loss provision permitted by the tax
code has not always equaled the true cost of loan losses.
To complete the analogy, let the variable D now denote the value of out-
standing deposits. Then, the results derived above can be viewed as a ﬁrst
approximation of the user cost of capital for a bank. Applied to banks, however,
the model omits at least two important features. The ﬁrst is the implicit tax
imposed by reserve requirements. The second is deposit insurance premiums.
Reserve requirements obligate banks to hold non-interest-bearing reserves
in the form of vault cash or reserve accounts held with the Fed. Not all
bank deposits are subject to reserve requirements. Currently, the Fed imposes
a 10 percent reserve requirement only on transactions deposits—demand
deposits and certain interest-bearing transactions accounts such as NOW76 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
accounts.7 In the past, however, the Fed imposed reserve requirements on
certain classes of time deposits as well.
Thus, consider a bank that issues three types of deposits as well as nonde-
posit debt, such as subordinated debt and bank notes. Let
D1 = transaction deposits,
D2 = reservable time deposits,
D3 = nonreservable deposits, and
D4 = nondeposit debt. (21)
Debt of type i pays an interest rate ρi, i = 1,2,3,4. The cost of equity capital—
that is, the rate of return required by the bank’s shareholders—is ρ5. Under






λi = Di/V, i = 1,2,3,4, and
λ5 = S/V.
As before, assume that the λi, i =1,2, . . . , 5, are ﬁxed and constant over time,




D3 = λ3k, and (23)
D4 = λ4k.
Reserve requirements reduce the bank’s interest-earning assets by the frac-
tion of the deposits it is forced to hold as non-interest-bearing reserves. Let
α1 and α2 denote the required reserve ratio on deposits of type D1 and D2,
respectively. Then, total required reserves are (α1D1+α2D2). Total funds raised
7 Lower reserve requirements apply to the ﬁrst $52 million of transactions accounts out-
standing at each bank, and this tranche changes each year depending on changes in the average
amount of all transactions accounts outstanding. The present analysis ignores this low-reserve
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by the bank, k, are allocated to loans, denoted by the variable b, plus required
reserves. Formally,
k = b + α1D1 + α2D2.
Substituting in for D1 and D2 from equation (23) yields
k = b + (α1λ1 + α2λ2)k,
which can be rewritten as
(1 − α1λ1 − α2λ2)k = b. (24)
Equation (24) expresses the relation between total funds raised and the amount
available to be invested in loans. The term (1−α1λ1 −α2λ2) is the fraction of
each dollar the bank raises that is available for investment in loans. The remain-
der goes to satisfy reserve requirements. Thus, nominal interest revenues are
ψ b, the true cost of depreciation is δb, and the taxable depreciation allowance
is ζb. Using (24), interest and depreciation expenses can be expressed as a
function of the capital stock, k. The result is
ψ b = (1 − α1λ1 − α2λ2)−1ψ k,
δb = (1 − α1λ1 − α2λ2)−1δk, and (25)
Z = (1 − α1λ1 − α2λ2)−1ζk.
Banks are also required to pay deposit insurance premiums on all domestic
deposits. Let the symbol β denote the deposit insurance premium. Then, total




Total taxable proﬁts are gross revenues from lending less deposit insurance
premiums, interest expense, and the provision for loan losses. Letting π denote
taxable proﬁts once again and R denote total interest payments made by the
bank to depositors and bondholders,




− R − Z. (26)
The bank’s after-tax cash ﬂow is just its revenues less loan losses, deposit
insurance premiums, and taxes:
Xa = (ψ − δ)b − β
X3
i=1 Di − θπ. (27)
Substituting the expression for taxable proﬁts (equation [26]) into (27) yields
Xa = (1 − θ)ψ b − (1 − θ)β
X3
i=1Di + θR − (δb − θZ). (28)78 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Consider the relation between interest expenses and the capital stock. Let
Ri, i =1, . . . , 4, denote total interest payments on debt of type i. Then,
Ri = ρiDi










is the weighted-average nominal interest cost.
Substituting from (25) and (29) into (28) yields an expression for net cash









+θρD − (1 − α1λ1 − α2λ2)(δ − θζ)
i
k. (31)
The after-tax discounted value of this investment is Va = ρ−1Xa. As before,
the bank’s user cost of capital can be derived by imposing the equilibrium
condition Va = k. The result is
ψ =
γp(θ,β)












denotes the pre-tax ﬁnancial cost of capital.
These last two expressions are very similar to those derived in the previous
case (equations 18 and 19) except that the pre-tax ﬁnancial cost of capital in
(33) now includes the cost of deposit insurance premiums. Thus, ρi + β is the
effective cost of issuing deposits of type i, i = 1,2,3, not including the cost of
reserve requirements.
Notice also that the expression for the user cost of capital in (32) differs
from the earlier user cost of capital presented in (18) in that the pre-tax ﬁnancial
cost of capital, γp(θ,β), is now divided by the term (1−α1λ1−α2λ2) to reﬂect
the cost of reserve requirements. The ﬁrm must now earn a marginal rate of
return
λp(θ,β)
1 − α1λ1 − α2λ2
> λp(θ,β)A. Kuprianov: Tax Disincentives to Commercial Bank Lending 79
after accounting for the after-tax loan loss expense,
¡
(δ − θz)/(1 − θ)
¢
, to pay
its depositors and shareholders the return on investment they expect.
Loan Loss Allowances
Banks report loan loss reserves, also known as provisions for loan losses,
on their balance sheets as an estimate of probable future loan losses. Under
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), any additions to loan loss
reserves, termed loan loss allowances, are deducted from reported income in
the period the provisions are made and not in the period when the loss actually
occurs. When a bank subsequently determines that a loan is uncollectible, it
reduces its loan loss reserves by the amount of the loss. Because the impact of
the loan loss on earnings is taken into account when the loan loss reserve is
created, the act of writing off the loan has no direct impact on income reported
in that period.
For a variety of reasons, banks typically maintain loan loss reserves in
excess of their expected losses for the coming year.8 Before 1987, the tax
code permitted all commercial banks to deduct loan loss allowances, up to
a stipulated maximum, from taxable income. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
changed the rules for computing deductions for loan losses, however, reducing
the loan loss deductions available to many banks. The discussion that follows
describes the tax treatment of loan loss allowances, both before and after the
Tax Reform Act.
The Tax Treatment of Loan Loss Allowances for Large Banks
Since 1987, “large” commercial banks (banks with assets over $500 million)
have been permitted to deduct loan losses from taxable income only as they are
recognized. Many analysts feel that this rule, known as the “speciﬁc charge-
off” method, produces the most accurate measure of true economic income,
as it requires banks to recognize both interest income and loan losses in the
year they accrue.9 If one accepts this argument, the current tax treatment of
loan loss allowances accorded to large banks speciﬁes a deductible loan loss
allowance that equals the true “depreciation” of the loan portfolio. To model
the post-1987 loan loss provision for large banks, then, set
Z = δb. (34)
8 See Walter (1991) for a more detailed discussion of the factors determining loan loss
reserves.
9 See, for example, Buynak (1987), Neubig (1984), and Neubig and Sullivan (1987). For a
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In this case, the user cost of capital given in equation (32) reduces to
γp(θ,β)
1 − α1λ1 − α2λ2
+ δ, (320)
where γp(θ,β) is as given in equation (33).
Tax Treatment of Loan Loss Allowances for Small Banks
A “small” bank (one with assets less than $500 million) can choose between
the speciﬁc charge-off method and the “experience reserve” method. Under
the experience reserve method, a bank may deduct additions to its bad debt
reserves up to a maximum amount determined by the product of its eligible
loans outstanding and a six-year moving average of its historical loan loss
ratio. To see how this method works, let δ(t) denote the actual loan loss ratio
experienced in year t, and ¯ δ(t) = (1/6)
P5
i=0 δ(t−i) the moving-average of the
current and past ﬁve years of loan loss ratios. Then, the maximum loan loss
reserve (LLR) permitted in year t is
LLR(t) = ¯ δ(t)b(t),
where b(t) denotes eligible loans outstanding in period t. The corresponding
maximum loan loss allowance deduction is
Z(t) = δ(t)b(t) +
¡
LLR(t) − LLR(t − 1)
¢
. (35)
If the size of a bank’s loan portfolio does not change over time, then
the experience reserve method is roughly equivalent to the speciﬁc charge-off
method. In the case of a bank with a growing loan portfolio, however, use of
the experience reserve method has the effect of accelerating the recognition
of future loan loss deductions and causes taxable income to understate true
economic income (Neubig and Sullivan 1987). To simplify notation and better
understand the properties of these provisions, assume that the loan loss ratio is






where ∆b(t) = b(t)− b(t − 1) is the change in eligible loans outstanding from
year (t − 1) to year t. Clearly, this reduces to the speciﬁc charge-off method
currently permitted to all banks when ∆b(t) = 0.
To examine the more general case where the bank’s loan portfolio may
grow over time, let
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Substituting this last result into equation (36) yields the following expression
Z(t) = δ(1 + µ)b(t).10 (37)
Tax Treatment of Loan Loss Allowances before Tax Reform
Before 1987, commercial banks were permitted to choose among several dif-
ferent methods for calculating the taxable loan loss allowance: the experience
method, the speciﬁc charge-off method (both as described above), and the
“percentage method.” The percentage method was similar to the experience
method, except that the deductible loan loss allowance was 0.6 percent of total
eligible loans outstanding. As before, let LLR(t) denote the allowable loan loss
reserve in year t. Then, the allowable loan loss allowance would be calculated
as in equation (35) above, except that in this case
LLR(t) = 0.006b(t).
Substituting this last speciﬁcation into equation (35) yields the result
Z(t) = δb(t) + 0.006∆b(t). (38)
In the special case where the size of a bank’s loan portfolio stays constant
over time, ∆b(t) = 0 and the above expression reduces to Z(t) = δb(t), which
is the same as the deduction permitted under the speciﬁc charge-off method.
In the more general case where ∆b(t) = µb(t), one obtains
Z(t) = (δ + 0.006µ)b(t). (39)
Substituting this last result into equation (32) yields the following expression
for a bank’s user cost of capital under the percentage method
γp(θ,β)








where, as before, γp(θ,β) is as given in equation (33).
Loan Loss Reserve Recapture Provisions
In addition to eliminating the percentage method, the Tax Reform Act of 1986
also required large banks to recapture any existing loan loss reserves in excess
of actual losses. Under this provision, large banks were required to report
as income a fraction of 10 percent of excess bad debt reserves in 1987, 20
10 The astute reader will note what seems to be a logical inconsistency here, as the foregoing
analysis has assumed a constant loan portfolio size while the depreciation rules allow for a growing
loan portfolio. Interested readers are invited to verify that the results presented in the text would
remain unchanged in all substantive respects if loan portfolio growth were taken into explicit
account in the capital budgeting problem.82 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
percent in 1988, 30 percent in 1989, and 40 percent in 1990.11 Assuming that
banks knew that their excess loan loss reserves would be subject to recapture
after 1986, these recapture provisions would effectively reduce the value of the
1986 loan loss deduction by the expected present value of future excess tax
payments.12
To calculate the present value of the recapture provisions, one must take
into account any expected future changes in the statutory tax rate. In addition
to mandating the recapture of the loan loss reserve, the Tax Reform Act also
lowered the statutory corporate tax rate from 46 percent in 1986 to 40 percent
in 1987 and to 34 percent thereafter. As a result, a dollar in loan loss reserves
deducted before 1987 produced a 46-cent reduction in taxes, while the subse-
quent recapture of a dollar in loan loss reserves increased future taxes by a
smaller amount. Thus, the present value of 1987 taxes attributable to the loan
loss recapture would have been (0.40)(0.1)e−ρ. Similarly, the present value of
taxes due to the loan loss recapture for subsequent years would have been
(0.34)
¡
0.2e−2ρ + 0.3e−3ρ + 0.4e−3ρ¢
.
On net, then, taking account of the recapture provisions, the expected present
value of the loan loss allowance to a large bank in 1986 would have been
Z(1986) =
©









3. THE MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATE ON
COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING
The foregoing analysis has been almost entirely theoretical, focusing on the
qualitative effects of explicit and implicit taxes on the user cost of capital. A
purely theoretical analysis does not permit one to gauge the quantitative im-
portance of speciﬁc tax rules, however. Nor can it answer questions regarding
11 The act provided exceptions for ﬁnancially troubled institutions, which were permitted to
defer payment of taxes on the amount of the recapture. It also permitted banks to accelerate the
recapture. This last provision permitted banks reporting losses between 1987 and 1990 to avoid
paying at least part of the tax on the recapture (see U.S. Congress, 1987, pp. 549–57). The present
analysis ignores such considerations.
12 Even in the absence of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, banks’ authorization to use the
percentage method would have expired after 1987 (Henderson 1987). The tax reform of 1969
had instituted a gradual reduction of the maximum limit on loan loss reserve deductions, and the
expiration of the authority to use this method was expected to trigger some type of recapture.
Nor did the banking industry have reason to expect that forthcoming legislation would reinstate
this deduction. The U.S. Treasury had given the treatment of bad debt reserves special attention
during the debate over tax reform (see Neubig [1984]). Therefore, although the Tax Reform Act
was not passed until the summer of 1986, it seems reasonable to assume that commercial banks
expected they would be required to recapture their excess loan loss reserves after 1987.A. Kuprianov: Tax Disincentives to Commercial Bank Lending 83
the overall impact of legislation such as the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which
lowered statutory tax rates while imposing offsetting reductions in the allowable
deduction for loan losses. To answer such questions, one needs an empirical
measure of the user cost of capital for banks.
Figure 1 depicts the behavior of the pre-tax and after-tax user cost of capital
for commercial bank lending from 1986 to 1995. This period is an interesting
one, as it includes a major change in tax laws and two separate instances where
reserve requirements were reduced. The data used to compute these series
were obtained from various reports that all insured banks must ﬁle routinely
with the federal regulatory agencies. Both series were obtained by aggregating
year-end data on all domestic commercial banks.13 As such, these series repre-
sent industrywide weighted averages. The values of the parameters character-
izing tax rules and reserve requirements during this period are summarized in
Table 1.
The pre-tax cost of capital in Figure 1 is calculated using the formulas
speciﬁed in equations (32) and (33). In accordance with the earlier discus-
sion of the tax treatment of loan loss allowances, the loan loss deduction for
1986 includes the present value of the future loan loss reserve recapture man-
dated by the Tax Reform Act, as characterized in equation (40).14 The loan








µ − (40/46)0.1e−ρ − (34/40)
¡
0.2e−2ρ
+ 0.3e−3ρ + 0.4e−4ρ¢¤
for t = 1986, and
δ for t ≥ 1987.
The after-tax cost of capital is just the pre-tax cost of capital with all
tax parameters, αi, θ, and ζ, set to zero. How best to treat deposit insurance
premiums presents certain conceptual problems. To the extent that deposit in-
surance reduces funding costs for banks, the deposit insurance premium, β,
just reﬂects the offsetting cost of the ﬁnancial guarantee. If deposit insurance
were privately provided and supplied at a market-determined price, the deposit
insurance premium would not be viewed as a tax on commercial bank inter-
mediation. As noted earlier, however, FDIC deposit insurance premiums may
not always reﬂect the fair market value of the underlying guarantee. If they are
set too low, they represent a subsidy. If they are increased to raise funds for
other purposes, such as rescuing a competing deposit insurance fund, deposit
insurance premiums can constitute a tax. For the present, assume that deposit
13 A more detailed description of data sources and calculations can be found in the Appendix.
14 For now, I assume that all banks are “large” banks that are subject to the speciﬁc charge-
off method and the recapture of loan loss reserves. In later sections, I will examine the marginal
impact of the loan loss recapture provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the marginal tax
beneﬁt of the experience reserve method, which small banks continued to enjoy throughout the
period under consideration.84 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 Pre-Tax and After-Tax User Cost of Capital












insurance is fairly priced. Accordingly, the after-tax cost of capital in Figure 1
is calculated according to the formula
γa(β) =
£
λ1(ρ1 + β) + λ2(ρ2 + β) + λ3(ρ3 + β) = λ4ρ4 + λ5ρ5
¤
+ δ. (41)
The marginal impact of deposit insurance premiums on the cost of capital will
be examined in a later section.
The Taxation of Commercial Banking: 1986–1995
There are several ways in which one can measure the marginal effective tax
rate. The simplest measure is the difference between the pre-tax and after-tax
cost of capital, which reﬂects the marginal cost of taxes on investment returns.
Alternatively, the marginal effective tax rate can be expressed as a percentage
either of the pre-tax or after-tax cost of capital.15 Figure 2 depicts the behavior
of the marginal effective tax rate, measured as the difference between the pre-
tax and after-tax user cost of capital. Notice that the marginal effective tax rate
has fallen on average over the period in question, from a high of 126 basis
points in 1986 to under 70 basis points in recent years. Most of this decline took
place in the two years immediately following enactment of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, corresponding to the period in which the reductions in the statutory tax
rate mandated by the act were phased in. By 1988, the marginal effective tax
15 See Bradford and Fullerton (1981) for an analysis of the properties of these different
summary statistics.A. Kuprianov: Tax Disincentives to Commercial Bank Lending 85




Present Value of the Deduction for















(0.2e−2ρ + 0.3e−3ρ + 0.4e−4ρ)b(t)] Time: α2 = 3%c
1987 40d δb(t) Transaction: α1 = 12%
Time: α2 = 3%c
1988 34 δb(t) Transaction: α1 = 12%
Time: α2 = 3%c
1989 34 δb(t) Transaction: α1 = 12%
Time: α2 = 3%c
1990 34 δb(t) Transaction: α1 = 12%
Time: α2 = 3%
1991 34 δb(t) Transaction: α1 = 12%
Time: α2 = 0%
1992–1995 34 δb(t) Transaction: α1 = 10%e
Time: α2 = 0%
a Before the Tax Reform Act of 1986, corporations with taxable income below $100,000 were subject to a
lower rate. In addition to lowering the statutory tax rate to 34 percent, the act changed the graduated tax
structure. Starting in 1987, the threshold for lower tax rates was lowered to $75,000. Both before and after
the Tax Reform Act, corporations with incomes exceeding the threshold were subject to a surcharge meant to
recover the beneﬁt of lower tax rates on income below the threshold. Currently, corporations must pay a 5
percent surcharge on income over $100,000 up to a maximum of $11,750. As a result, corporations with taxable
incomes over $335,000 pay both an average and a marginal statutory rate of 34 percent. (For more details, see
U.S. Congress [1987], pp. 271–72.) In constructing the weighted-average cost of capital, it was assumed that
all banks were subject to the maximum statutory tax rate.
b The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 required that $2 million of reservable liabilities
of each depository institution be subject to a zero percent reserve requirement. The act instructs the Board
of Governors to adjust the amount of reservable liabilities subject to this zero percent reserve requirement
each year by 80 percent of the annual percentage increase in the total reservable liabilities of all depository
institutions. In 1996, this zero-reserve tranche was raised to $4.3 million.
The Monetary Control Act of 1980 established a low-reserve tranche against which a 3 percent reserve
requirement is applied. In 1995, a 3 percent reserve requirement was applied to the ﬁrst $52 million in reserv-
able deposits. As with the zero-reserve tranche, this amount is adjusted each year by 80 percent of the total
percentage increase in the total reservable liabilities of all depository institutions. The user cost of capital
calculations ignores the zero- and low-reserve tranches, since, at the margin, virtually all banks are subject to
the higher reserve requirement listed in the table.
c During this period, reserve requirements on time deposits applied only to nonpersonal time deposits with an
original maturity less than 11/2 years. The reserve requirement on nonpersonal time deposits was reduced to
zero at the end of 1990.
d The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the maximum statutory tax from 46 percent to 34 percent, effective for
taxable years beginning on or after July 1, 1987. Income in taxable years including July 1, 1987, was subject
to a blended rate. According to the methodology speciﬁed in the act, the effective statutory tax rate for the
1987 calendar year would have been calculated as (181/365)x(40%) + (184/365)x(34%) = 40%, as there were
181 days between January 1, 1987, and June 30, 1987, and 184 days between July 1, 1987, and December 31,
1987. For more details, see U.S. Congress (1987), pp. 272–73.
e The reserve requirement on transaction deposits was reduced from 12 to 10 percent in April 1992.86 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 The Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Commercial Bank Lending
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rate had fallen by almost half, to 66 basis points, suggesting that the reduction
in the statutory corporate tax rate more than offset the loss of the loan loss
reserve deduction.
Figure 3 compares the behavior of the marginal effective tax rate with that
of the average tax rate, computed as taxes paid as a percent of pre-tax earnings.
To facilitate comparison, the marginal effective tax rate in Figure 3 is expressed
as a percent of the pre-tax cost of capital. In light of the earlier discussion, it
should not be surprising to ﬁnd that the behavior of the marginal effective and
average tax rate measures differ so much. Whereas the marginal effective rate
falls dramatically after 1986, the average tax rate rises. The difference in the
behavior of these two series is in part due to the timing of the recognition
of cash ﬂows. Recall that the marginal effective tax rate incorporates the full
present value of the future loan loss recapture in 1986—consequently, the cost
of recapture does not inﬂuence the marginal tax rate in later years. In contrast,
the measured average tax rate recognizes these taxes only as they accrue.
The behavior of the average tax rate also reﬂects other changes in tax
rules that did not affect the incentive of commercial banks to make loans. One
of the major provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was the repeal of
the tax deductibility of interest payments on municipal bonds. Before 1987,
commercial banks paid no taxes on interest earned on municipal bonds, while
interest payments on bank debt issued to fund such investments was tax de-
ductible. Partly as a result of this favorable tax treatment, the average tax
rate for commercial banks tended to be low, especially when compared to the
average tax rate on most other industries. The perception that banks enjoyedA. Kuprianov: Tax Disincentives to Commercial Bank Lending 87
Figure 3 Comparison of Average and Marginal Effective Tax Rates










too many tax advantages led Congress to repeal the tax deduction on interest
from municipal bonds, along with the tax deduction for bad debt reserves.16
As Henderson (1987), Neubig and Sullivan (1987), and O’Brien and Gelfand
(1987a, b) note, however, the increase in the average tax rate due to the repeal
of the tax deduction for interest on municipal bonds is largely illusory. Because
interest paid on municipal bonds is not subject to federal taxes, interest rates
on such bonds tend to be lower than interest rates on taxable bonds—in fact,
the interest rates paid on municipal bonds tend to be comparable to after-tax
interest rates on taxable bonds. Thus, the interest rate differential between tax-
able and nontaxable bonds can be viewed as an implicit tax. After losing this
tax deduction in 1987, banks tended to substitute taxable bonds for municipal
bonds, with the result that taxable income increased along with taxes paid.
Although banks paid higher federal taxes on average, the impact on their after-
tax return was minimal. The principal result of this change in tax laws, then,
was to substitute explicit taxes paid to the federal government for implicit taxes
that were previously paid to municipalities.
Despite these considerations, Figure 3 does hold a seeming puzzle. Note
that the marginal effective tax rate tends to be much lower than the measured
average tax rate; this despite the inclusion of the cost of reserve requirements
and deposit insurance premiums in the marginal rate but not in the average rate.
Three different factors can help explain this apparent anomaly. First, Henderson
16 See U.S. Congress (1987).88 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
(1987) notes that many large banks have substantial foreign operations, which
are subject to higher tax rates. Second, to the extent that nonﬁnancial assets are
effectively taxed at a higher rate than ﬁnancial assets such as commercial loans,
the result would be to raise the average tax rate above the marginal effective
tax rate on lending. Finally, the marginal effective tax rate calculations derived
earlier and illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 assume banks earn no pure economic
proﬁts. To the extent that banks do earn economic proﬁts, the marginal effective
tax rate on such proﬁts just equals the statutory tax rate, which is currently 34
percent.17
The Long-Run Impact of Tax Reform
As noted earlier, the data depicted in Figure 2 suggest that the reductions in
the statutory corporate income tax rate that took place in 1987 and 1988 more
than offset the loss of the tax deduction for the bad-debt reserve. Care must
be taken in interpreting this result, however, because the marginal effective tax
rate is inﬂuenced by many factors, not just changes in tax rules. Moreover,
the inﬂuence of the future recapture of the deduction for loan loss reserves
mandated by the Tax Reform Act exerted a signiﬁcant transitory inﬂuence on
the marginal effective tax rate in 1986.
A measure of the long-run marginal impact of the Tax Reform Act on
the marginal effective tax rate can be calculated by computing the user cost
of capital for a single year under the two sets of tax rules, ignoring recapture
provisions. The results of such an exercise, performed using 1986 data, are
presented in Table 2. When the effect of the recapture provisions is excluded,
the marginal effective tax rate for 1986 falls to 92 basis points—thus, the
marginal impact of the recapture provisions was 34 basis points. Recomputing
the 1986 user cost of capital assuming a 34 percent tax rate and adopting the
speciﬁc charge-off method reduces the marginal effective tax rate another 30
basis points. From these two exercises, one can conclude that about half of the
observed decline in the marginal effective tax rate between 1986 and 1988 was
attributable to the long-run impact of tax reform. Although other factors also
contributed to the observed decline in the marginal effective tax rate during
this period, their inﬂuence was minimal.
Tax Reform and Small Banks
The last exercise ignored the differential treatment accorded to small banks
by the Tax Reform Act and assumed that all banks lost the loan loss reserve
deduction. Recall, however, that small banks were permitted to continue using
the experience reserve method in determining their loan loss deduction. What
impact did tax reform have on these institutions?
17 See Bradford and Fullerton (1981) for a more comprehensive discussion of this last issue.A. Kuprianov: Tax Disincentives to Commercial Bank Lending 89
Table 2 The Long-Run Marginal Impact of Tax Reform on










Before Tax Reform 126 92
After Tax Reform 63 63
Small Banksc
Before Tax Reform NA 92
After Tax Reform NA 63
a Calculated using 1986 year-end industrywide ﬁnancial data.
b The marginal effective tax rate for large banks before tax reform was calculated using a statutory
tax rate of 46 percent and assumes that banks used the percentage method to calculate the loan
loss allowance. The tax rate after tax reform was computed assuming a 34 percent statutory tax
rate and assumes that banks use the speciﬁc charge-off method.
c The user cost of capital for small banks is based on the same data used in the large bank
example, except that the calculations assume use of the experience reserve method, under which
ζ = δ(t) +
=





i=0 δ(t − i) and µ represents the growth rate of eligible
loans. As with the ﬁrst exercise, the before-tax-reform user cost of capital is calculated assuming
a 46 percent statutory tax rate, and the after-tax-reform user cost is computed assuming a 34
percent tax rate.
An approximate measure of the marginal effective tax rate for small banks
can be obtained using industrywide weighted averages. Speciﬁcally, consider
a hypothetical representative “small” bank that experienced the same realized
loan loss ratios and growth rates in outstanding loans as did the industry in the
aggregate. Next, compute the user cost of capital assuming that this bank takes
advantage of its option to use the experience reserve method, as characterized in
equation (37). This last result can then be used to compute an marginal effective
tax rate measure for small banks using the experience reserve method.
Table 3 compares the marginal effective tax rates under the speciﬁc charge-
off (small bank) method with that obtained using the experience reserve (large
bank) method.18 Notice that the two tax rates differ by no more than 6 basis
points after 1986. The difference between the two in 1986 can be accounted
for almost entirely by the present value of future loan loss recoveries imposed
on large banks.
Evidently, the favorable treatment of loan loss reserves accorded to small
banks by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has had only a small impact on the
18 For 1986, the “large” bank effective tax rate calculation assumes that banks use the
percentage method to calculate the taxable deduction for loan loss reserves.90 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 3 Comparison of the Marginal Effective Tax Rate
for Large and Small Banks
Large Banks Small Banks Difference
1986 126 92 34
1987 74 71 2
1988 66 64 2
1989 74 71 3
1990 73 72 1
1991 64 66 −2
1992 57 58 −1
1993 57 53 4
1994 59 53 6
1995 69 63 5
Note: All ﬁgures are expressed as basis points.
marginal effective tax rate on lending. The largest beneﬁt to small banks con-
ferred by the act was in exempting them from the recapture of past excess
contributions to loan loss reserves.
The Cost of Reserve Requirements
The derivation of the user cost of capital given in equation (32) showed how
non-interest-bearing reserve requirements increase the cost of funding a loan.
Figure 4 shows the net overall impact of reserve requirements on the user cost
of capital from 1986 to 1995, obtained by calculating the difference between
the pre-tax cost of capital, including the cost of reserve requirements, and the
pre-tax cost of capital net of reserve requirements:
γp(θ,β)
1 − α1λ1 − α2λ2
− γp(θ,β).
As Figure 4 shows, the cost of reserve requirements fell signiﬁcantly after 1990,
from approximately 20 basis points in that year to just over 10 basis points in
1994. There are at least three factors that might account for this decline. The
ﬁrst was the elimination of reserve requirements against time deposits in 1991
and a subsequent reduction from 12 to 10 percent in the required reserve ratio
for transaction deposits in 1992. The second is a decline in interest rates. The
third is a decline in banks’ reliance on reservable deposits—to the extent that
banks substitute nonreservable liabilities for those bearing reserve requirements,
they can effectively avoid paying the implicit reserve requirement tax.
The elimination of reserve requirements against time deposits accounted for
almost 2 basis points of the observed decline in Figure 4, while the reduction
in the reserve ratio for transaction deposits accounted for just under 3 basisA. Kuprianov: Tax Disincentives to Commercial Bank Lending 91
Figure 4 The Cost of Reserve Requirements
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points.19 The remainder of the reduction can be attributed to falling interest
rates. Changes in the ratio of reservable deposits to other liabilities does not
appear to have contributed to the observed reduction in the overall cost of
reserve requirements.20
Deposit Insurance and the Cost of Capital
From 1935 to 1989 all insured U.S. commercial banks paid the FDIC an annual
statutory deposit insurance premium of 0.0833 percent of domestic deposits (or
8.33 basis points). The effective deposit insurance premium was often much
lower, however, because the FDIC frequently rebated some portion of these pre-
miums. Such rebates ended in the late 1980s after a large increase in the number
of bank failures threatened to deplete the FDIC’s Bank Insurance Fund (BIF).
Using its newly acquired authority to increase deposit insurance assessments,
the FDIC raised its assessments to 0.2125 percent in 1991 and again in 1992
19 Estimated cost savings stemming from the 1991 elimination of reserve requirements
against nonpersonal time deposits were obtained by measuring the marginal cost of such re-
serve requirements at the end of 1990. Similarly, estimated cost savings associated with the 1992
reduction in required reserve ratios on transaction deposits reﬂect the marginal cost of holding an
extra 2 percent reserve requirement at the end of 1991.
20 Although the importance of demand and other transaction deposits has fallen substantially
in the past 25 years, transaction deposits accounted for approximately 20 percent of the value of
debt plus equity throughout the period 1986–1990, falling slightly from 1985 to 1990 and rising
modestly thereafter.92 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
to 0.23 percent. Following a congressional mandate, the agency adopted risk-
based assessments in 1993. Under this latter system, banks paid assessments
in the range of 0.23 to 0.31 percent. The minimum assessment was lowered to
0.044 percent in mid-1995 after BIF reached its mandated capitalization level,
and well-capitalized and well-managed banks received a small rebate that year.
In 1996, the FDIC reduced its risk-based premiums further to a range of zero
to 0.31 percent.21
Figure 5 shows the marginal contribution of the cost of deposit insur-
ance premiums to the pre-tax user cost of capital, calculated by subtracting
a measure of the pre-tax user cost of capital that excludes deposit insurance
premiums from the pre-tax user cost including deposit insurance premiums.
The dramatic increase in the cost of deposit insurance after 1989 reﬂects the
increases in effective deposit insurance assessments imposed during this period.
These increases had a substantial impact on banks cost of capital. From 1992 to
1994, deposit insurance premiums contributed between 16 and 18 basis points
to the pre-tax user cost of capital, up from 6 basis points in 1988.
Whether deposit insurance assessments should be treated as a tax on the
banking industry depends on how fairly the FDIC’s assessments reﬂect the cost
of its ﬁnancial guarantee. A recent study by Epps, Pulley, and Humphrey (1996)
computed “fair” deposit insurance premiums for a sample of 77 banks using
1989 data. That study found that the median fair deposit insurance premium
was 0.0107 percent of deposits (assuming one bank examination per year),
compared to the 0.0833 deposit insurance premium charged that year. At ﬁrst
glance, these ﬁndings seem to suggest that deposit insurance is overpriced. A
closer look at the authors’ results reveals certain important mitigating factors,
however. The fair deposit insurance premiums for individual banks in the study
ranged from a low under 0.0001 percent to a high of 0.7749 percent. The authors
note, however, that the FDIC can reduce the effective cost of its liability to
depositors of a troubled bank through more frequent monitoring, which is the
current policy of the bank regulatory agencies.22 Nonetheless, these ﬁndings
indicate that deposit insurance requires well-managed and conservatively run
banks to subsidize banks that pose greater risks to the deposit insurance fund. To
be sure, the adoption of risk-based assessments has ameliorated this problem
somewhat. But although the adoption of risk-based assessments has reduced
the subsidy to risky banks, the ﬁndings of Epps, Pulley, and Humphrey (1996)
indicate that the current risk-based assessment scheme would not have been
sufﬁcient to eliminate the subsidy to the riskiest banks in 1989. What Figure 5
shows, then, is the deposit insurance tax on the safest banks. Based on available
21 For more details, see FDIC (1995).
22 The fair deposit insurance premiums reported here do not include the cost of bank exam-
inations. Epps, Pulley, and Humphrey (1996) also discuss examination costs.A. Kuprianov: Tax Disincentives to Commercial Bank Lending 93
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information, it is not clear whether the current risk-based assessment scheme
constitutes a tax on the industry as a whole.
Legislation enacted during 1996 does use the deposit insurance system to
impose a tax on commercial banks, however. Beginning in 1997, all banks
will be required to pay a special charge of 1.29 basis points to help pay the
interest on bonds issued in 1987 to recapitalize the thrift industry’s deposit
insurance fund. That surcharge is scheduled to increase to 2.43 basis points
in 1999. Understandably, the commercial banking industry resisted legislation
requiring it to help pay for the losses incurred by the thrift industry. The banking
industry had paid very high deposit insurance premiums during the early 1990s
to recapitalize its own deposit insurance fund, and bankers did not wish to
see their premiums raised once again to help rescue a competing industry’s
fund. My model shows that these surcharges will not have a dramatic impact
on the banking industry’s cost of capital, however. Using 1995 year-end data,
the effect of a 1.29 basis point surcharge would be to increase the pre-tax user
cost of capital by less than 1 basis point. A 2.43 basis point surcharge would
produce an increase of less than 2 basis points.
4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In 1986, the banking industry paid an average effective tax rate of just under
24 percent. Since the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, however, the
average effective tax rate has been over 30 percent. A cursory inspection of
these data would seem to suggest that the tax burden on the banking industry94 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
has risen in recent years. A closer look at the factors accounting for this rise
suggest otherwise, however. The increase in the average tax rate paid by banks
over the past decade is due largely to the elimination of the interest deduction
on municipal debt for banks. Banks, in return, have responded by substituting
into taxable corporate debt, which pays higher interest rates. Although banks
now pay more federal taxes, they also earn more pre-tax income. Moreover, the
elimination of the tax deduction for municipal debt had no impact on banks’
incentive to extend other forms of credit, which is inﬂuenced by the marginal
effective tax rate on bank lending.
An examination of the recent behavior of the marginal effective tax rate on
bank lending paints a much different picture, suggesting that the tax disincen-
tives to commercial bank intermediation have fallen modestly over the past ten
years. The decline in the marginal effective tax rate is due principally to two
factors. The ﬁrst is the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Although tax reform resulted
in higher average tax rates, it reduced the marginal effective tax rate on com-
mercial bank lending. The second factor is the reduction in the implicit reserve
requirement tax, which is due partly to reductions in reserve requirements and
partly to declining interest rates.
This article began by questioning the extent to which the tax burden borne
by the commercial banking industry may have contributed to the declining
share of bank lending in credit markets. For many years, the commercial bank-
ing industry enjoyed special tax treatment, meant in part to compensate for the
burden of regulation, including the cost of reserve requirements. Commercial
banks now face the same federal tax rules as other lenders, however. At the
same time, they also continue to bear the cost of reserve requirements. Although
reserve requirements have been reduced in recent years, they still impose an
approximately 10 basis point cost penalty on banks out of a total marginal
effective tax rate of roughly 70 basis points. Even though the tax burden on
commercial banking has fallen by some measures, implicit taxes continue to
handicap the ability of banks to compete against other lenders. More impor-
tantly, recent statutory reductions in reserve requirements accounted for less
than half of the reduction in the cost of reserve requirements in recent years—
the rest was due to falling interest rates. In the absence of further policy actions,
then, an increase in interest rates could increase the marginal effective tax rate
on commercial bank lending substantially.
Many observers feel that any regulatory burden borne by banks, including
the burden of reserve requirements, is mitigated by unique beneﬁts such as de-
posit insurance and access to the Fed’s discount window. The foregoing analysis
showed that changes in deposit insurance assessments contributed substantially
to the banking industry’s cost of capital from 1992 to 1995. Deposit insurance
assessments have fallen dramatically over the past year, however, and now
account for a negligible fraction of the cost of ﬁnancing a loan (except for the
few banks that must pay the highest deposit insurance assessment rate of 31A. Kuprianov: Tax Disincentives to Commercial Bank Lending 95
basis points). Moreover, the estimated impact of the recent deposit insurance
surcharge imposed on commercial banks to help pay for the recapitalization
of the thrift industry’s deposit insurance fund is exceedingly small and would
appear to pose no undue burden on the industry. Whether deposit insurance
represents a subsidy to the banking industry continues to be the topic of an
active debate. Fortunately, the burden of explicit corporate taxes and the implicit
cost of reserve requirements can be quantiﬁed.
APPENDIX : ESTIMATION OF THE USER
COST OF CAPITAL
For the ﬁnancial cost of capital, ρ =
P5
i=1 λiρi, estimates of interest expense
were obtained using data available in the FDIC Historical Statistics on Bank-
ing. The cost of equity capital was estimated using the basic CAPM model,
following the procedure suggested by Ibbotson and Sinqueﬁeld (1989). The
estimate for the stock market beta needed for this calculation was obtained
from Berkovec and Liang (1991). The results are summarized below.











1986 6.16% 0.95 0.88 14.52%
1987 5.47% 0.95 0.88 13.83%
1988 6.35% 0.95 0.88 14.71%
1989 8.37% 0.95 0.88 16.73%
1990 7.81% 0.95 0.88 16.17%
1991 5.60% 0.95 0.88 13.96%
1992 3.51% 0.95 0.88 11.87%
1993 2.90% 0.95 0.88 11.26%
1994 3.90% 0.95 0.88 12.26%
1995 5.60% 0.95 0.88 13.96%
Estimates of ﬁnancial structure, as reﬂected by the parameters λ1,λ2, . . . ,
λ5, were obtained from the Quarterly Reports of Condition and Income, or
Call Reports, and from the Federal Reserve’s Weekly Report of Transaction Ac-
counts (FR2900). Data on loan charge-off rates came from the FDIC Historical
Statistics on Banking, while data on effective deposit insurance assessments are
from the FDIC Annual Report for 1995.96 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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